

CUBA'S REPORT

**Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/7,
entitled "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and
financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against
Cuba"**

May, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The US blockade against Cuba in figures

Introduction

1. Persistence and tightening of the blockade policy

1.1 Effective implementation of the blockade laws.

1.2 Impact of Cuba's inclusion in the US State Department unilateral List of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism.

2. The blockade violates the rights of the Cuban people

2.1 Impacts on highly sensitive sectors.

2.2 Impacts on economic development, trade, and finances

2.3 Impacts on the emerging sectors of the Cuban economy

3. The blockade is a violation of International Law. Extraterritorial implementation of the blockade.

4. Universal rejection of the blockade.

Conclusions

Annex 1: US blockade laws and regulations

Annex 2: Blockade measures adopted by the US government between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the implementation of the blockade against Cuba.

Annex 4: Some examples of the extraterritorial implementation of the blockade against Cuba between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

Annex 5: Actions denouncing the blockade against Cuba between March, 2024 and May, 2025.

The US blockade against Cuba in figures

The cost of 4 months of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to purchase the buses needed by the public transportation system in the country (USD 2,850,000,000).

The cost of 2 months of blockade is equivalent to the cost of the fuel needed to meet the country's regular power demand (USD 1,600,000,000).

The cost of 2 months of blockade is equivalent to the financing needed to guarantee the delivery of the rationed family food basket to the population during one year (around USD 1,600,000,000).

The cost of 16 days of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to meet the needs of the country's National List of Essential Medicines (around USD 339,000,000).

The cost of 14 days of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to increase the share of renewable energy sources in the country's energy matrix from 24 per cent to 26 per cent (around USD 300,000,000).

The cost of 12 days of blockade is equivalent to the annual financing required for the maintenance of the National Power Generation System (around USD 250,000,000, excluding fuel and investments costs).

The cost of 6 days of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to import medical consumables (cotton, gauze, syringes, needles, sutures, catheters, IV equipment, among others) and the reagents needed by the national health system during one year (around USD 129,000,000).

The cost of 2 days of blockade is equivalent to the cost of annual maintenance required by public transportation in the country (USD 40,000,000).

The cost of 21 hours of blockade is equivalent to the financing required to replace deteriorated and obsolete technological resources in the country's educational institutions (USD 18,133,050).

The cost of 14 hours of blockade is equivalent to the cost of purchasing the insulin needed to meet the country's demand during one year (USD 12,000,000).

The cost of 5 hours of blockade is equivalent to the cost of purchasing toys and teaching aids needed in all daycare centers of the country (around USD 4,500,000).

The cost of 2 hours of blockade is equivalent to the purchase cost of medications used for the treatment of psychiatric, neurological, and heart conditions, as well as food for children with genetic deficiencies and endocrine metabolic diseases (around USD 1,400,000).

The cost of 19 minutes of blockade is equivalent to the cost of the electric and conventional wheelchairs required to meet the needs of the country's special education system (USD 280,506).

The cost of 17 minutes of blockade is equivalent to the purchase cost of the medication Nusinersen for the annual treatment of infantile spinal atrophy (USD 250,000).

The cost of 10 minutes of blockade is equivalent to the financing needed to cover the demand of hearing aids for children and teenagers with disabilities who are enrolled in the country's special education system (USD 142,966.82).

Introduction

The main goal pursued by the US government, which is to overthrow the Cuban Revolutionary Government, has not changed. The economic, commercial, and financial blockade is the main pillar of its policy of maximum pressure against the Island, which is intended to suffocate its economy, generate shortages and discontent in order to provoke a social outbreak that would lead to a change in the constitutional order legitimately established by the Cuban people in the exercise of their self-determination.

Nothing better illustrates the criminal nature of the US government's blockade against Cuba, which is contrary to International Law, than the internal memorandum drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory, dated April 6, 1960:

“(...) every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba (...) a line of action which, while as adroit and inconspicuous as possible, makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.”

President Donald Trump's policy of economic and financial harassment seeks to satisfy his political commitments to the anti-Cuban far right and ignores the majority support of US public opinion, the international community and Cuban émigrés in that country in favor of lifting the blockade and normalizing relations between the two countries.

Representatives of the current US administration have acknowledged that their goal is to refine the design of the maximum pressure policy to make it more effective in terms of damaging the Cuban economy and people. They have stated that they will be more creative in identifying and attempting to cut off Cuba's external sources of income, with the open goal of attempting to cause the collapse of the Cuban economy.

Between March, 2024 and February, 2025, the US administration rigorously applied the laws and practices of the blockade, with actions aimed at identifying, persecuting and eliminating, in a surgical and systematic manner, the main sources of income of the Cuban economy.

The most severe measures were Cuba's permanence in the unilateral list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism; its new inclusion in the list of countries that do not fully cooperate with the US government's counterterrorism efforts; the possibility of filing lawsuits in US courts under

Title III of the Helms-Burton Act¹; sanctions or threats against shipping companies, carriers, insurers or reinsurers involved in supplying fuel to Cuba; the persecution of Cuban financial transactions for the supply of essential resources; as well as Cuba's inclusion in other unilateral listings.

The US government has further improved a coercive strategy that includes, among other measures, the persecution of international medical cooperation agreements offered by Cuba and the offensive against tourism traveling to the country. Added to this are the ongoing disinformation and manipulation operations on digital platforms, orchestrated and financed from the US, to present a distorted image of Cuba's reality, portraying a country on the brink of collapse and a people at odds with their government.

Joined by anti-Cuban politicians, that country's authorities have cynically insisted that the difficulties experienced by the Cuban economy were the result of the implementation of a socialist model and the mistakes made by the government, in an attempt to hide the negative impact of the blockade on all areas of the country's economic and social life, as well as the obvious responsibility of the US government in this regard.

While all the shortages and problems faced by the Cuban people are not exclusively due to the US government's blockade and its cumulative effects, those who deny that this policy represents the main obstacle to Cuba's development, or ignore the fact that, without the blockade, all these problems would be solved more quickly, would be lying.

The blockade against Cuba is the longest-lasting and most comprehensive and complex system of unilateral coercive measures ever imposed against any country in history. This reality is undeniable.

From March 1, 2024, to February 28, 2025, the material damages and losses caused by the blockade to Cuba were estimated at **USD 7,556,100,000**, which represents a **49 per cent** increase as compared to the previous period.

This increase is a direct consequence of the tightening of the policy of suffocation and financial persecution against Cuba, with actions surgically designed against our country, aimed at undermining the economy, affecting strategic sectors for our development, hindering international trade activity and preventing the arrival of essential supplies for the population.

¹ Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act

It is mainly due to the increased impact of incomes foregone from exports of goods and services, estimated at around **USD 2,608,000,000**; and the geographical relocation of trade amounting to **USD 1,212,700,000**.

Another factor that has contributed to such a high impact has been the US government's policy of promoting and encouraging the emigration of Cuban professionals and technicians, whose explicit purpose is, on the one hand, to provoke a migration crisis to justify its hostility against Cuba and, on the other, to deprive the country of part of its workforce, most of which is made up by highly skilled professionals.

In this regard, damages to the Cuban economy are estimated at **USD 2,570,400,000**. This has been calculated based on the significant amount of resources allocated to the training of these personnel, since education in Cuba is public and free and the Cuban government subsidizes this sector, to which it has allocated 23 per cent of the State budget in 2025.

Likewise, the absence of these professionals and technicians has a direct impact on the country's ability to maintain normal economic development rates, whether in production, services, or any other activity. It also affects innovation capability, technological development and generational renewal in strategic sectors.

These increases show that the blockade is real and has been tightened to unprecedented levels in recent years. The blockade is the main obstacle to the country's development.

All of that represents an impact of more than **USD 629,675,000 per month**, over **USD 20,701,644 per day** and more than **USD 862,568 per hour** of blockade.

At current prices, the cumulative damage resulting from the implementation of this policy for over six decades amounts to **USD 170,677,200,000**. Taking into account the value of the dollar against the price of gold at the international market, the blockade has caused quantifiable damages estimated at **USD 2,103,897,000,000**.

It has been estimated that, without the blockade, Cuba's GDP, at current prices, could have grown by around 9.2 per cent in 2024. These figures speak volumes about the damage caused by the blockade. The Cuban government could have implemented many more social programs and promoted development projects had it had access to these resources.

There is not a single sector of Cuba's social and economic life that escapes the effects of the blockade. The majority of the Cuban population

has been born and lived under the constant siege of this criminal policy, which directly affects their well-being, quality of life and rights.

This report shows the extent of this grave injustice, even though the full impact of this criminal policy will never be fully quantified.

Persistence and tightening of the blockade policy

Effective implementation of the blockade laws

Ignoring the unequivocal position of the international community, expressed in successive resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the US government continues to rigorously enforce the laws that make up the complex framework of the blockade against Cuba. These laws are listed in Annex 1 of this Report. Annex 2 describes the main legal and regulatory actions taken to enforce the blockade between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

The so-called Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, known as the “Helms-Burton Act,” codified the provisions of the blockade with the intention of depriving the US government of the ability to relax its suffocation policy against Cuba. This law, contrary to the US Constitution itself and the norms and principles of International Law, removes from the US President the power to lift the blockade, a prerogative that falls to the US Congress. However, it grants the President broad powers to modify its implementation through licenses and executive actions, which are described in Annex 3.

Just six days before the end of his term, on January 14, 2025, President Joe Biden exercised those prerogatives by removing Cuba from the US State Department's list of countries that allegedly sponsor terrorism; suspending the implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act; repealing the Presidential National Security Memorandum No. 5 of June 2017 and eliminating the list of restricted Cuban entities. This decision was a belated and limited correction of several aspects of this cruel and unjust policy.

However, some of these measures were reversed by President Donald Trump on his first day in office by signing the Executive Order *“Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions”* on January 20, 2025. This led to the new inclusion of Cuba in the list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism, which showed the highly politicized nature of these unilateral lists and the fact that they are not based on evidence, but on the murky dealings of US politics.

Subsequently, and in accordance with Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, US courts were allowed to hear lawsuits against individuals or companies linked to nationalized properties, with the aim of internationalizing economic pressure and deterring foreign direct investments in Cuba. This possibility had been suspended by all previous US presidents since 1996, by virtue of a prerogative provided for by the law itself. At the end of March, 2025, 45 lawsuits had been filed under Title III -30 of them are still ongoing litigations. The main areas that have been targeted by this US congressional legislation are tourism, shipping, mining, construction, fuel supply and distribution, airlines and agriculture.

As part of its policy of maximum pressure, in February, 2025, the US government rejected dozens of Cuban passports and did not grant visas that had been processed by Cuban government agencies. This decision directly affects bilateral exchanges in areas of mutual interest and benefit for the peoples of Cuba and the US, such as culture, health, education, science and sports, thus politicizing the natural relationship between neighboring peoples.

The reissue of Presidential Memorandum No. 5 on June 30, 2025, by the US government confirms the policy of maximum economic pressure as a criminal and illegal tool to pursue hegemonic objectives and regime change in Cuba. It reinforces the aggression and economic blockade imposed by the US government. The current text, like the original dated June 2017, provides a platform to further improve the mechanisms of economic and political coercion against the country and against third countries having ties with Cuba.

Statements by representatives of the US government, including its Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and anti-Cuban congress members, have confirmed the intention to cut off all possible sources of external income for Cuba; damage tourism and travel by US citizens and citizens from other countries; sabotage international medical cooperation; hinder fuel supplies; obstruct the inflow of family remittances; scare away foreign direct investments and hamper trade; and torpedo Cuba's economic and cooperative relations with third countries or blocs made up by these countries. The new document adds up to the corpus of coercive measures against Cuba that already existed through well-known laws and regulations.

No other nation has been faced with such a long-lasting, anachronistic, systematic and extreme framework of aggressive and coercive laws and policies.

Impacts of Cuba's inclusion in the US State Department unilateral List of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism

The arbitrary and unjustifiable inclusion of Cuba in this list, while reinforcing its deterrent and intimidating effects on third parties in their commercial relations with Cuba, has increased the Country Risk; caused serious difficulties for our operations in the banking and financial sector, international trade, access to financing, fuel purchase, access to the suppliers of goods and inputs that are essential for economic development; and discouraged foreign investments.

Dozens of banks suspended their operations with Cuba, including transfers for the purchase of food, medicines, fuel, materials, spare parts for the national power system, and other essential goods. The Cuban economy lost its traditional suppliers. Due to the Country Risk and the inability to access faster and more expeditious logistics routes, additional costs had to be incurred into to acquire these inputs.

Numerous Cuban diplomatic missions have faced difficulties due to foreign banks refusal to provide them with financial services, thus hindering their normal functioning. This also hampered and, in some cases, prevented Cuba from honoring its financial obligations to international and regional bodies.

Travel and tourism to Cuba, one of the country's main sources of income, have been severely penalized, since the visa waiver program through the ESTA² system is not valid for people who have visited Cuba. This is due to the continued enforcement of the US "Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015," which arbitrarily designates Cuba as a State sponsor of terrorism.

In addition to that, anti-Cuban sectors in the US government and Congress manipulate Cuba's continued permanence in that list to impose the false narrative that the Island constitutes a threat to US security, justify their hostility and expand the punitive legal basis against our country. This pretext has been used by the current US administration to impose restrictions to official bilateral cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, travel by Cubans to the US and scientific cooperation.

The blockade violates the rights of the Cuban people

² Electronic System for Travel Authorization. It is part of the US Visa Waiver Program, which allows citizens of countries participating in the program to enter the US for tourism, business, or transit purposes and remain in the country for a maximum period of 90 days

The economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the US government against Cuba is an act of genocide and a massive, flagrant, and systematic violation of the human rights of the entire Cuban people. It directly and indiscriminately affects their enjoyment of these rights, as well as national efforts to protect them. The express purpose of generating misery, hunger and despair confirms its criminal and inhumane nature.

The unprecedented tightening of the blockade in recent years has had a particular impact on the public health sector. The tense situation created in our economy, the financial persecution of Cuba and the denial of access to the US market to acquire technologies, medicines, and medical devices have hampered the ability of our health system to obtain these supplies when needed and provide quality service to the population. This has, in turn, led to the deterioration of several health indicators, including those related to mortality.

Impacts on highly sensitive sectors

The blockade has a real and permanent impact on the health sector, affecting the free, universal, and quality medical care that has always been guaranteed to the Cuban people.

The cancellation of contracts; the refusal of shipping companies to transport cargo to Cuba; the impossibility of using products and technologies containing more than 10 per cent of US components, together with increased costs and the persecution of income sources have seriously hampered the acquisition of essential supplies. This not only harms basic health care for the population, but also has a debilitating effect on the medical personnel, institutions and families, thus impacting essential services, which are currently limited.

Within the period between March, 2024 and February, 2025, this policy caused losses estimated at **USD 288,833,610** to this sector.

The National List of Essential Medicines in Cuba includes 651 items, 250 of which are imported and 401 are produced locally, but 69 per cent of them have been impacted by the blockade. Of this big total, 364 medicines are in short supply, representing 56 per cent of the total.

Due to the blockade, Cuba cannot normally access advanced US-manufactured technologies and medicines, or medical equipment in which more than 10 per cent of components are made in the US. Instead, it should do so through third markets at much higher prices. Here are some examples:

- Percutaneous aortic prostheses, such as the Edwards-SAPIEN or CoreValve valves to treat heart diseases, especially in persons of advanced age. These valves allow patients suffering from severe valve stenosis to undergo surgery without having to resort to highly complex procedures. Aortic stenosis is a degenerative disease and is prevalent among adults over 65 years of age. Approximately 30 per cent of these patients cannot undergo surgery due to contraindications associated with co-morbidities. With this device, 158,800 patients could be treated without the need to resort to a complex surgery.
- Pacemakers manufactured by the company Medtronic, as well as pacemaker lead extraction equipment. Given this restriction, conventional cardiovascular surgery has had to be used, despite the complications this procedure entails. During this period, it was not possible to implant permanent pacemakers on 375 patients.
- Cardiac stimulation devices (implantable cardioverter-defibrillators). The companies that used to sell these devices to Cuba have increased the percentage of US-manufactured parts. Several Cuban patients suffering from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy have been waiting for several months for an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator, which they have been unable to obtain due to the consequences of the blockade.
- Non-fluoroscopic mapping equipment manufactured in the United States and used to treat atrial fibrillation and complex arrhythmias, such as ventricular tachycardia. Approximately 45,000 people in the country suffer from these conditions. Not a single case has been operated on since 2020. These patients have had to be treated solely with medications. There is only one piece of such equipment in the country, which is out of service due to the impossibility of providing the corresponding maintenance.
- Oncological medicines such as Pemetrexed, for lung cancer; Palbociclib, for breast cancer; and Brentuximab vedotin, for post-transplant refractory Hodgkin's lymphoma.
- First- and second-line medicines for the treatment of lung and colon cancers and sarcomas, such as Pembrolizumab, manufactured by the pharmaceutical company Merck Sharp and Dohme; and Nivolumab, manufactured by the pharmaceutical company Bristol Myers Squibb. Something similar occurs with pediatric cancer

treatments, such as the medicine Lomustine, used for the treatment of brain and bone marrow tumors.

- Reagents necessary for the accurate diagnosis of patients suffering from neuroblastoma (a cancerous tumor that grows from nerve tissue). Chromosomal studies are required to determine the risk group to which the patient belongs and define the appropriate treatment. The blockade prevents access to these reagents in the US market.
- Advanced technology equipment, such as the Philips ultrasound equipment card, which is important for cardiovascular, obstetric, and gynecological treatments; bronchoscopy, argon plasma, and cryotherapy equipment to remove skin lesions; or endobronchial prostheses.
- Advanced and highly effective biological therapies for patients suffering from lupus and rheumatoid arthritis.
- Diagnostic technologies and tools indispensable for therapeutic decisions when treating patients suffering from cancer, such as the Oncotype DX Breast Cancer Test and Oncotype DX Colon Cancer Test manufactured by the company Genomic Health, Inc.
- Microscopy equipment with reflective focus, to improve the effectiveness of the diagnosis of skin cancer and other dermatoses.
- Endoscopic surgery equipment; consumables, such as silicone drainage tubes and catheters; prostheses for erectile dysfunction surgery; artificial sphincters for male urinary incontinence as well as advanced medicines for the treatment of prostate cancer patients, such as Abiraterone and Enzalutamide, which reduce mortality and improve quality of life.
- First-line biological treatments for the control of Crohn's disease (a chronic gastrointestinal condition) and ulcerative colitis (inflammatory bowel disease). The impossibility to purchase these treatments in the US market forces us to resort to more distant markets, with the consequent increase in costs and the negative impact on the number of patients to be treated.

- Medical accessories for patient care in procedures applied to examine the bile and pancreatic ducts and the treatment of portal hypertension and esophageal tumors. These accessories are mainly produced by US companies and cannot be purchased in that territory due to the restrictive measures of the blockade.
- Circulatory assist devices for hemodynamically unstable patients, the vast majority of which are manufactured in the United States.
- Continuous insulin infusion pumps for patients with type 1 diabetes, as well as continuous glucose monitoring technology, manufactured by the US company Abbott.
- Pediatric ventricular support systems, which are only manufactured in the US, for the treatment of postoperative low cardiac output (a common complication after heart surgery), which occurs in 15 per cent of patients and becomes irreversible in a group of them, some of whom could survive with these devices.
- Deep brain stimulation and invasive vagus nerve stimulation devices, a therapeutic alternative for movement disorders and epilepsy. These devices are mainly manufactured and marketed by three US companies (Medtronic, Boston Scientific and Abbott).
- Medications for Parkinson's disease. The most effective of them is Levodopa. Cuban patients do not have access to the US formulation of this product, Sinemet, or to other important ones such as Ropinirole, Pramipexole and Rotigotine.
- The drug Nusinersen for the treatment of infantile spinal atrophy. Its effectiveness has been proven by keeping more than half of the children suffering from this deadly disease alive. This medicine is manufactured by the US company Biogen Inc., and is therefore not available for Cuban patients.
- Drugs for the treatment of dementia in elderly patients, such as Memantine, Donepezil and Rivastigmine; or insulin for the treatment of diabetes mellitus in patients belonging to this age group.

- We have been denied access to arterial prostheses manufactured by US companies. This poses serious difficulties to the study and treatment of peripheral vascular diseases, which impacts on the rate of amputations.

The first cause of death in children under 1 year of age in 2024 in the country was congenital malformations. Due to the restrictions imposed by the blockade, there is a serious limitation of the resources necessary for the prenatal and postnatal diagnosis of these, as well as for their intrauterine treatment.

The difficulties in acquiring the medicines used to treat childhood hematological cancers have forced us to modify first-line treatment schemes that had allowed us to achieve survival rates of over 75 per cent. Examples of these medicines are Lomustine and Methotrexate, used in the treatment of osteosarcoma. Consequently, we must use second-line and third-line drugs, which are less effective. Survival rates have therefore been reduced to 60 per cent.

Surgery has been one of the most affected areas as a result of the shortage of resources (medications, consumables and medical equipment). Currently, 94,729 patients are on the waiting list for undergoing. Of these, 9,913 are children who are treated by the specialties of oncology, ophthalmology, general surgery, orthopedics, urology and gynecology. Besides, 4,507 cancer patients are awaiting surgery.

Furthermore, it is still impossible to acquire US technology related to robotics to perform surgeries. The US company Intuitive Surgical, which is the only manufacturer of the Da Vinci Xi Robot, refuses to sell it to Cuba as a result of the restrictions imposed by the blockade.

At the same time, the US firm Baxter Healthcare, the leading seller of dialysis machines in Latin America, refuses to sell equipment to Cuba, as do other similar companies such as the US firm Drake Whillock, which has expressly cited the blockade as a repeated reason for not selling its products to our country. This has affected nephrology services.

Refurbished dialysis machines are readily available in the US, but they are not accessible to Cuba. The prices of these equipments represent between one-third and one-quarter of the price of brand-new machines. Cuban importer entities, which had to turn to Europe to purchase them, could have obtained 54 refurbished machines in the US for the price of the 18 new ones that were purchased, which would have guaranteed care for another 180 patients.

The shortage of raw materials and financing, resulting from the impact of the blockade, has made it difficult to access various types of drains; mammary clips for myocardial revascularization and other basic consumables and medications, such as catheters, diuretics, anticoagulants and antihypertensive medicines. For this reason, 340 patients have not been able to undergo surgery during this period.

Surgeries for patients with cardiovascular conditions have been significantly delayed due to a lack of oxygenators used during these procedures, which has had a major impact on mortality and the worsening of the condition for which these patients need to be operated on.

The lack of availability of technologies, which cannot be acquired for having more than 10 per cent of their components manufactured in the United States, hinders the diagnosis of genetic diseases in Cuba, especially those affecting neurological development. Furthermore, we are prevented from acquiring the technologies necessary for the mass sequencing required for the diagnosis, treatment and prognosis of various types of cancer, such as breast cancer, which has an impact on mortality from this disease and limits the effectiveness of cancer treatments.

Likewise, Osvaldo Enrique Fumero, a patient diagnosed with an abdominal aortic aneurysm, is awaiting surgery that could cause him to die if it is not performed. The surgery has been postponed while efforts continue to be made to acquire the necessary arterial prosthesis, which is sourced from the United States.

In June 2024, a supplier of the Cuban company Medicuba had to apply for a license from OFAC to export cobalt equipment, air compressors and spare parts used in the treatment of cancer patients to the country. As part of the US government's genocidal policy, one year has elapsed since the request was made and no response has yet been received from OFAC.

This has made it impossible for these essential resources to enter the country, which has delayed the timely application of treatments to cancer patients and prevented those with advanced stages of the disease from enjoying a better quality of life.

The siege imposed against Cuba also affects the assisted reproduction services offered by the Cuban public health system. The purchase of consumables, medicines, reagents, and embryo culture media is hampered, which prevents us from performing the number of in vitro fertilization cycles needed to meet the needs of our patients. Lidia Rosalea de la Fuente Pérez and Mijaíl Chacón de Armas are one of many Cuban couples who have been unable to fulfill the dream to conceive a child,

since the procedures they must undergo, despite the efforts made by our health system, have been slowed down for not having timely access to these resources.

The US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has banned scientists from Cuba and five other “countries of concern” from accessing 21 biomedical databases containing information on genetic variation, cancer cases, neurodegenerative diseases and other data. The decision, made on April 2 by the Trump administration, which further strengthens a long-term effort to prevent foreign access to data considered sensitive, also puts a halt on projects involving databases that include collaborators in the aforementioned countries.

The blockade affects not only the Cuban people, but also the American people themselves. The LABIOFAM S.A. Business Group continues to export VIDATOX 30CH, a homeopathic product used as a complementary therapy against cancer, to various countries around the world, where it has been very well received. The US ranks third in cancer incidence (in absolute terms for both sexes)³. The cost of individual treatments in that country can exceed USD 100,000 per year. If the blockade did not exist, US patients could have access to this product, thus generating an estimated USD 1,400,000 in revenues for Cuba.

This kind of siege does not allow other Cuban products, such as Heberprot-P, which has proven effective in the treatment of diabetic foot ulcers, to be used on US patients. This medicine reduces the number of amputations due to this disease, with a direct impact on the health standards of any country. It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 US citizens are diagnosed with this disease every year, of whom around 500,000 develop complex ulcers that could be treated with Heberprot-P if the blockade did not exist.

Besides, US companies have expressed interest in acquiring the Cuban medicine Proctokinasa for the treatment of acute hemorrhoidal disease. It has been estimated that 10,000,000 US citizens suffer from this disease every year and that, of these, 1,500,000 require surgery. If the blockade did not exist, this medicine could benefit these patients, thus avoiding invasive procedures such as thrombectomy.

And as if that were not enough, the US government also persecutes Cuba's international medical cooperation, based on arbitrary and unfounded allegations of human trafficking. By resorting to such slanders,

³ Ferlay J, Ervik M, Lam F, Laversanne M, Colombet M, Mery L, Piñeros M, Znaor A, Soerjomataram I, Bray F (2024). Global Cancer Observatory: Cancer Today (version 1.1). Lyon, France: International Agency for Research on Cancer. Available from: <https://gco.iarc.who.int/today>

they seek to delegitimize this honorable and altruistic work and hinder the inflow of legitimate resources in those cases where cooperation is offered in the form of “compensated technical assistance,” under plans backed by the UN, which are fully compliant with the international standards governing South-South cooperation.

Harassment by US officials in various countries against Cuban medical brigades, aid workers, as well as ministers and health authorities of those nations, has increased significantly. The persecution of international medical cooperation agreements, among others, is part of a coercive strategy aimed at preventing the inflow of indispensable income to meet the growing needs of the population, which resulted in an estimated loss of **USD 3,249,838**.

The economic siege that prevents access to foreign currency, supplies, raw materials, fertilizers, machinery, fuels, chemicals and technology has also led to a significant decrease in **food production**. Furthermore, the impossibility to hire a significant number of shipping companies has interrupted the arrival to the country of supplies that have already been paid for.

All of this has led to a shortage of agricultural machinery, insufficient feed for livestock and a deficit of spare parts for equipment and industry, thus hindering the agricultural system's capacity to meet the demand, both in the domestic market and in foreign trade. From March 2024 to February 2025, the impact on this sector amounted to **USD 51,981,900**.

The main impacts on this sector are outlined below:

- During this period, wholesale supplies were insufficient and the deficit of products in the retail market persisted, together with an unstable supply of the basic items of the rationed family basket and fragmented deliveries to the population. In 2024, the planned distribution of several products to the population could not be met, with a marked decrease as compared to 2023 in products such as beans, sugar, coffee, oil, powdered milk, soy yogurt, meat products, chicken, beef, and domestic fuels (coal and natural gas), as well as medically prescribed diets, with priority given to children suffering from chronic diseases and pregnant women. The shortage of financing resulting from the attack on the sources of income of the Cuban economy and the late arrival of imported raw materials has severely impacted on this situation.
- The deficit in hard currency financing; the decline in exports and the marked financial persecution resulting from the impact of the

blockade have affected the availability of essential sources of raw materials, including agricultural products, milk, fruit for the canning industry, beef and pork, as well as imports such as powdered milk and wheat, which are essential to meet the needs of the population.

- It becomes increasingly difficult to hire ships to transport wheat to the country, despite having the necessary financing. This has significantly affected the production cycle of bread destined for the population's daily consumption.
- The country needs 1,800 tons of powdered milk per month to ensure coverage for children, medically prescribed diets and pregnant women, only as part of the basic food basket. The cost of this amounts to USD 8,500,000 per month. Although food supplies for children aged zero to two years –considered a priority age group– has been guaranteed, it has not been possible to guarantee powdered milk for children aged two to six years in the provinces that receive this product.
- One ton of cooking oil costs approximately USD 1,829; thus, it is necessary to spend USD 4,000,000 per month to supply this product to the entire Cuban population. For five months during the period under review, it became impossible to guarantee cooking oil deliveries.
- The meat products company Bravo S.A. recorded losses estimated at USD 905,900 because it was unable to purchase raw materials in the US market. With this amount, the company could have purchased 1,500 tons more of meat raw materials and produced 2,800 tons of finished product.
- The National Center for Plant and Animal Health (CENSA) cannot purchase raw materials, supplies, and materials for the production of vaccines, medicines, and other veterinary products, nor can it market Cuban vaccines in the US market or in third countries with US investment.
- Medicines intended to ensure avian health could not be purchased in time, which caused losses in the animal stock. In addition to that, poultry equipment, which could have increased the capacity to breed poultry for human consumption, could no longer be imported.

- Due to the lack of financing caused by the blockade, approximately 337,000 tons of corn and 120,300 tons of soybeans for feed production could not be purchased. As a result of that, egg production destined to be distributed as part of the rationed family basket was not met.
- Should the blockade not exist, Cuba would be able to acquire the best poultry genetics available in the US and the production of fresh eggs for domestic consumption and even a surplus for export could be boosted. This is a strategy that is also affected by the shortage of food and the need for updated technology.
- Pork production in 2024 experienced a notable decline –it only reached 53 per cent of the production levels achieved in 2023. The inability to import food and inputs to ensure biosafety in pig farms affected the supply of pork to the industry, thus causing shortages of this product and an increase in the prices of pork and pork products.
- The restrictive measures imposed by the US government prevent Cuban rum and tobacco from being sold in the US market. The losses incurred as a result of that have been estimated at USD 19,511,100. This amount could have been used to purchase food and medicines and improve industrial and social infrastructure.

The main impacts on the acquisition of commodities are related to non-compliance with import plans due to lack of financing for payments; insufficient access to credits; increase in the prices of products and services; increase in freight costs and delayed arrivals of goods.

Although there are some exceptions to the blockade, such as the limited sale of chicken and a few other products, these transactions are far from being considered as normal trade. Due to agricultural subsidies in the US, the prices of these products are lower as compared to prices in other markets, which leads Cuba to choose to purchase certain foodstuffs there. However, these purchases are made under strict conditions: they require specific licenses from the Department of Commerce; they must be paid for in cash and in advance, without any possibility to receive financing or credits, as opposite to modern commercial practices. Besides, goods must be transported only by US vessels that are only allowed to make one-way trips, which considerably increase freight costs.

These restrictions hinder the supposed trade between the US and Cuba and evidence that the blockade truly exists. The sole purpose of these measures is to deter and discourage any type of business with Cuba, thus limiting its ability to trade freely, which negatively affects its economy.

Overall, during this period, **damages and losses in the agricultural sector amounted to USD 932,316,224.**

The blockade imposed by the US government has a profound and multifaceted impact on the production of teaching aids in Cuba, which seriously affects the quality and development of the education system at all levels. During this period, commercial operations were restricted and access to international credit for the acquisition of raw materials and other resources used in the production of teaching aids was limited. In this sector, the effects of the blockade during the period under review has been estimated at **USD 89,771,200.**

MSc. Lisandra Guerra Sosa, who works at the Workers and Peasants Night College 'Treinta Aniversario de la Batalla de Guisa' (Thirtieth Anniversary of the Battle of Guisa) in the municipality of Bayamo, in the Granma province, states that as a result of the blockade policy, they are faced with *"limitations in the availability of instructional materials such as textbooks, workbooks, specialized dictionaries, maps, laboratories, among others, for the teaching of language classes. There is also insufficient availability of computers, TV sets and spare parts to guarantee quality education. Sometimes the communication platform of the sector's website is blocked, and we cannot publicize the achievements that are made."*

Impacts such as this are being felt throughout the entire country, which also affect the acquisition of materials, spare parts and accessories necessary for the manufacturing of pencils, paper, notebooks, drawing instruments, tempera paints, visual arts teaching modules, paper, toilet bowls, ballpoint pens and other educational materials in Cuba. The Total impact has been estimated at CUP 33,932,004. As a result of this, a total of 2,147,300 textbooks could not be printed for the academic year 2024.

Yoelandi Argote Rodríguez is a 15-year-old Cuban teenager who uses a cochlear implant. The restrictions imposed by the blockade prevent him from receiving accessories for his medical devices, forcing him to resort to lip reading as an alternative in the communication and teaching-learning process.

Besides, 940 students with deafness or hearing loss have not been able to receive adequate care due to the impossibility of purchasing from the US market computers for correction and compensation of specialized

treatments; cochlear implant procedures; equipment and air conditioning for the auditory stimulation room and hearing aids. Purchasing them from a more distant market involves higher costs, which means that less equipment can be imported and, consequently, there is a lower number of students receiving this service.

In addition to these restrictions, there are other issues affecting this sector:

- Of a total of 1,093 childcare facilities, 35 have been shut down due to structural problems. The lack of funding resulting from the negative impact of the blockade on the country's sources of income has prevented a prompt solution to this problem.
- In early childhood education, there is a continued shortage of toys and teaching aids, which affects the implementation of educational activities that encourage the learning of skills. If the blockade did not exist, 67,035 children of different ages could benefit from these means.
- For the education of children and teenagers suffering from visual impairments, 63 Braille machines and 20 Braille printers are required. Only three of the latter are currently available. Difficulties in accessing financing prevented the acquisition of these essential means for the education of these students during 2024.
- To meet the needs of children with motor and hearing disabilities, 538 electric and conventional wheelchairs and 1,107 hearing aids must be purchased. At the same time, the 16 existing audiometers in the provinces are in poor condition, which affects the auditory stimulation of more than 300 students attending special schools and 800 attending regular schools. The impact amounts to USD 295,548.35.
- Academic exchange is being limited and Cuban teachers, specialists, and students are unable to attend in-person and virtual events. The impossibility to conduct transactions in US dollars; the denial of visas to attend events and the banned access to virtual platforms such as Zoom, Cisco Webex and Interprefy hinder the preparation and training of teaching staff and students.
- At the Central University 'Marta Abreu' of Las Villas (UCLV), there are at least three virtual events every week in which it is impossible

to participate due to banned access to web platforms. In January, 2025, this university welcomed a delegation of professors from Carthage College from the US, with the aim of establishing some cooperation. However, the proposed Memorandum of Understanding will not be signed until the US counterpart makes an assessment of the possible punitive measures and actions that this cooperation could entail. This is a clear example of the deterrent effect of the blockade.

In the field of sports, the impact during the period under review amounts to **USD 4,114,091**. There has been an increase in the restrictions imposed and the costs of sport equipment, fabrics, footwear, technical and pedagogical resources, technological support, among others, which are mainly produced in the US. The purchase of these products in third countries increases expenses by more than 50 per cent.

The main impacts reported in this area relate to obstacles to receive payments for professional services provided abroad and in Cuba. This has been clearly evidenced by the prohibition of payments to Cuba and the financial persecution of incomes obtained from Cuba's participation in sport events, arbitration, ticket refunds, and prizes won by Cuban athletes, as well as the export of sports services.

New methods have been introduced to hinder banking operations, such as the request for additional documents to process such transactions, which causes delays and makes it difficult to make payments and charge for services rendered.

In this regard, funds transfers to Cuban sports federations resulting from the hiring of Cuban athletes abroad have been increasingly hindered. For example, it was not possible to transfer to Cuba funds from the Nippon-Ham Baseball Club in Japan. This forced the country to spend these funds in Japan, which were used to purchase balls for children, with the consequent increase in transportation costs. Had this funding been available in Cuba, this purchase could have been made in Panama with 50 per cent savings in costs. With the funds used to cover freight costs, 948 more balls could have been purchased.

Cuba is a member of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and, as such, is required to pay its annual dues. Last year, the country made payments in February, but in November, Banco Central de Cuba reported that the transaction was reversed due to internal policies of the beneficiary's bank. To date, it has not been possible to pay the fees for the years 2024 and 2025, which could prevent Cuba from participating in international events or hosting events in the country if this situation persists.

As in previous years, this period was also characterized by the non-payment of Cuban athletes' contracts with different clubs, due to the refusal by foreign banking and financial institutions to process transactions with Cuba's Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI).

In early 2025, the current US administration denied visas to the basketball team that was to participate in a qualifying tournament in Puerto Rico. Actions such as this, coupled with excessive controls on our delegations at US Immigration and Customs, as well as smear campaigns on social media aimed at preventing Cuba from hosting events have persisted and generated substantial losses.

In June, 2025, the US government denied visas to members of the delegation that would represent Cuba in the Norceca Final Four women's volleyball tournament, to be held in Puerto Rico. This action, contrary to the commitments inherent in the responsibility taken up by countries hosting international sporting events, hinders Cuba's participation in a competition that is part of the qualifying route for the 2026 Central American and Caribbean Games scheduled to be held in Santo Domingo and counts towards NORCECA and world rankings.

This is an unfair and discriminatory position, contrary to the principles of sport and "fair play", which adds to what has happened so far this year against delegations from other disciplines.

The denial of visas to the Cuban girls' softball technical team in July 2025, without any valid justification, is another example of the current US government's attack on Cuba. This decision prevents the Cuban team from participating in the Little League World Series. Contrary to the spirit of international sportsmanship, this decision makes the dreams of these girls yet another victim of the blockade and hatred of the US government.

In the **sphere of culture**, the blockade significantly restricts the possibility to promote, publicize and market Cuban talents, further hindering the search for market niches and business opportunities. Consequently, sales prices are depressed and access to and enjoyment of our art by audiences from all continents is hampered. During this period, the quantified impact on this sector amounts to **USD 195,095,600**.

The blockade hinders access to technologies for the production of digital books, hampering their promotion and sale, since many digital platforms cannot be used from within the country, and online stores that establish contractual relationships directly with a Cuban company are exposed to sanctions.

Cuban orchestras and musicians are directly affected by the blockade, which prevents them from accessing the US market. If the blockade did not exist, at least ten Cuban orchestras could tour the US annually, generating approximately USD 3,000,000 in revenues.

The extraterritorial implementation of the blockade has made it difficult to exchange royalty payments between the Cuban Music Copyright Agency (ACDAM) and foreign societies, as banking institutions in several countries have refused to process financial transactions with the Cuban entity Banco Financiero Internacional (BFI).

Cuba's Recording and Music Publishing Company (EGREM) cannot sell its productions directly on the US market. It depends on intermediaries located in the US or in third countries. In addition to that, the bank accounts of EGREM and its potential partners in that country are subject to continued persecution, forcing the company to resort to intermediaries in third countries. This leads to increased costs and delays in negotiation processes.

Cuban artists find it difficult to obtain visas and participate in international events, such as the Latin Grammys and other music festivals in the US. In 2024, they were unable to participate in major competitions, affecting their careers and the publicizing of their talent.

Due to the shortage of raw materials, a large number of titles -as many as 950- have accumulated and are yet to be published. This has had an incalculable cost in cultural and scientific terms, since the publishing plans for the period from 2020 to 2024 have not been met. Besides, the average amount of sales that failed to be accomplished due to this situation amounts to approximately USD 3,770,833.

Traditional suppliers in the portfolio of the Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria Cinematográficos (Cuban Institute of Cinematographic Art and Industry) now require only letters of credit confirmed by foreign banks as a method of payment. The cost they take up in terms of the country risk entails an additional increase of up to 50 per cent in import prices, only for carrying out commercial transactions with Cuba.

Since 2023, the Latin American Literary Agency, which is part of the Cuban Book Institute, had signed a contract with the Mexican television network Televisa for the renewal of the film adaptation of Félix B. Caignet's work entitled 'Morir por Vivir' (To Die for Living). However, Televisa subsequently joined forces with the US television network Univision, which

is not allowed to make payments to the Cuban agency. For this reason, payment remains outstanding.

The Japanese agency UniJapan has signed a contract for the publication of “Cuentos Completos” (Complete Short Stories) by the famous Cuban author Virgilio Piñera. In February of this year, the agency reported that it had not been possible to make the payment due to financial restrictions imposed on Cuba. The contract was signed for an amount of 2 thousand 916 dollars, which is still pending collection.

The website Spotify, which accounts for 80 per cent of the streamings generated by Cuban catalogs and is the main platform for music consumption, is a store that we cannot access for the purpose of monitoring its operation and creating profiles of our artists, which impacts on the promotion of Cuban culture internationally.

Impacts on economic development, trade, and finance

The economic development context in Cuba in 2024 became more complex as a result of the impact of the strengthened measures that make up the US blockade. The country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted by 1.1 per cent in 2024.

Should this genocidal policy not exist, the GDP growth during that year at current prices would have been 9.2 percentage points higher than recorded. The economy declined in 2024 and has recorded an 11 per cent downfall since 2018.

At the end of 2024, exports reached the figure of USD 9,639,000,000. Goods export plan was met by 92.5 per cent and the services export plan was met by 101.6 per cent. However, total exports accounted for USD 770,000,000 less than planned. This, combined with the fact that the economy's revenues were USD 900,000,000 less than expected, has forced the Cuban economy to work under even greater strain than in previous years.

Planned imports reached only 82.4 per cent of the 2024 target, and they focused on fuels, foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies. Continued declines were reported in key sectors such as food production, where the rationed family basket is currently 100 per cent covered with imported products.

A critical situation has been faced since the end of 2023, when the stable supply of different types of fuel was lost. In 2024, particularly during the second semester of that year, power generation faced an acute crisis due to equipment failures, the impact of two hurricanes and lack of fuel, especially diesel, with deficits ranging from 1,400 to 1,500 megawatts per day, including three disconnections of the National Electric Power Grid between October and December of 2024. This situation had a strong impact on the Cuban economy and the population.

Transforming the cost of the blockade into the country's payment capacity would provide an additional, substantial and sustained source of financing that would give greater momentum to investment programs linked to the strategic sectors identified by the National Economic and Social Development Plan until 2030. This would create the necessary conditions to gradually achieve sustained growth rates. The blockade policy is the biggest obstacle to the development of the Cuban economy.

Due to Cuba's inclusion in the unilateral list of States allegedly sponsors of terrorism, the costs of businesses involving foreign investments has increased and commercial operations, cooperative actions and investment projects that were at different stages of implementation have been cancelled.

The critical restrictions imposed on Cuba's socio-economic context had adverse impacts, even on United Nations programs in Cuba, particularly in terms of access to funding, including development financing; increased operating costs; limited access to goods, services, IT platforms and technologies patented in the US and to financial services from US banks.

Besides, the blockade prohibits shipping companies from other countries from calling at US ports for six months if they have previously touched a Cuban port. This measure entails a significant additional cost to our country's maritime transport and foreign trade and it represents an aggressive provision against third parties.

In the period from March 2024 to February 2025, losses due to the geographical relocation of trade, given the need to resort to more distant markets, were estimated at around **USD 1,212,700,000**.

Likewise, the costs of freight, insurance, and the use of commercial intermediaries, with the consequent increase in the price of goods, amounted to USD 1,127,100,000.

The impact of the blockade on production and services, due to the impossibility of acquiring spare parts, raw materials and products in the

US market, whose specifications cannot be replaced by other suppliers, has caused damages amounting to **USD 880,800,000**, a figure that is 80 per cent higher than that reported in the previous period.

There is also a system of draconian fines to prosecute transactions with Cuba from third countries, which further increases the cost of our foreign trade. Between March 2024 and February 2025, 40 foreign banks, for various reasons, refused to carry out transactions with Cuban banking entities (27 from Europe, 6 from America, and 7 from the rest of the world) which involved 140 transactions.

During the period under review, the US government's relentless persecution of financial transactions involving Cuba has affected virtually all sectors of the economy. This siege has led to the termination and/or breaches of contracts, loss of relationships with financial institutions that regularly worked with Cuban entities, indebtedness and delays in the sending and reception of funds and goods, among other difficulties.

Numerous companies from third countries that are traditional exporters of products and materials that are essential to the Cuban economy are refusing to act as suppliers or are finding additional difficulties to secure financing to support exports to Cuba. The cost of this extraterritorial effect is tens of millions of dollars worth and causes delays in supplies, shortages of raw materials, and severe damage to the country's manufacturing production.

This has had an extremely harsh impact on the Cuban economy, particularly on the commercial activities of companies and the links between Cuban and international banks.

One of the main impacts of this intimidating effect is the prohibition of transfers of funds in US dollars or other hard currencies; the cancellation of accounts of embassies and companies with Cuban interests abroad and financial services for businesses related to Cuba; and the denial of credit facilities or the processing of letters of credit.

This is the result of the surveillance and control mechanisms imposed by the US on international banking and a direct consequence of the fines worth millions of dollars that have been imposed on foreign banks in recent years.

At the same time, the persecution of the country's sources of hard currency incomes has deprived us of financial resources that are essential for acquiring vital supplies for the Cuban population.

During this period, **Cuban banks suffered losses amounting to USD 169,500,000** due to sharp exchange rate fluctuations resulting from the use of currencies from third countries, the ban on the use of the US dollar and the need to find alternatives so that financial flows can reach the country and other destinations.

This is an evidence of the exacerbated crisis that the country continues to face, in a very complex scenario characterized by the continued decline in foreign trade, with an incalculable impact on the socio-economic situation. Currently, there are virtually no open accounts left in US dollars in foreign banks owned by Cuba's commercial bank.

During this period, Cuba was only able to access very limited external financing and under extremely onerous conditions. Cuban banking and business entities continue to pay high interest rates above market rates due to the country risk rating applied to them. This exacerbates macroeconomic imbalances, reflected in an annual inflation rate of 24.88 per cent in 2024, with values that may differ depending on the type of market (13.97 per cent in the state segment, 82 per cent in the non-state segment and 4.03 per cent in the agricultural market segment).

These high levels of inflation are influenced by the issuance of money by the State to finance the budget deficit; the contraction of supplies, mainly in the state sector; the imported inflation due to high prices on the world market and, above all, the limited inflow of hard currency into the country as a result of the strengthening of the blockade.

Disinformation campaigns and financial manipulation through virtual tools, such as "El Toque," which is financially backed by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM), have also played a role. The aim is to distort exchange rates in the country, thus inciting the devaluation of the Cuban peso against the US dollar in order to generate price instability, a decline in the population's purchasing power, and the consequent social discontent.

The shortage of goods and services in formal markets, the proliferation of the informal market and the increase in prices have eroded the purchasing power of wages and pensions.

Despite the State's strong commitment to finding ways to mitigate the effects of the blockade, the economic situation remains adverse. The economy has been unable to advance more quickly and dynamically due to the impossibility of achieving the expected export revenues. In this regard alone, during the period under review, the blockade has caused damages amounting to **USD 2,608,000,000**.

Damaging **the tourism sector** has remained a priority of the blockade policy. Damages caused to this sector, particularly in the areas related to services, operations and logistical support, amounted to **USD 2,528,791,469** during the period from March, 2024 to February, 2025.

The arrival of visitors to Cuba decreased by 9.6 per cent as compared to 2023. With 2,203,117 international visitors, the planned target was met by 71.07 per cent. This situation was influenced by the cumulative effect of the blockade; Cuba's continued inclusion in the list of State sponsors of terrorism and the US government's continued enforcement of a list of restricted Cuban entities, which has included almost all of the country's hotel facilities. In terms of exports, losses in this sector during the period under review amounted to USD 1,114,600,000.

With regard to 2023, the arrival of US visitors decreased by 11 per cent. The ban on accommodation in most of the hotels included in the OFAC's list of restricted entities, as well as the conditions imposed by the US government on the use of private sector lenders under the 'travel category' have contributed to create this situation.

The measure adopted by the US government to eliminate general licenses for "people-to-people" educational group travel exacerbates the negative impact on the arrival of US visitors in the country. Although travelers from the US were already required to travel under the sponsorship of a US organization, which discouraged the arrival of visitors from that country, the new measure completely eliminates the possibility of traveling under this category.

Should the blockade and the ban on US nationals travels to Cuba as tourists not exist, our country would receive between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 US visitors every year, which will represent USD 2,410,826,390 dollars in revenues for the Cuban economy.

The implementation of the Helms-Burton Act has had a direct impact on the termination of business deals and contracts with foreign hotel operators and has influenced managers from third countries, who have declined their interest in exploring business opportunities with Cuba. Forty-one international operators have found themselves in this situation.

Restricted access to Cuban ports by US cruise lines, further strengthened by sanctions and legal proceedings against those that have operated with Cuba, has hampered progress in this sector. As a result of that, some 800,000 visitors from the US have stopped traveling to Cuba.

The US government's decision to require an entry visa for anyone who has traveled to Cuba or wishes to travel from our country, including those benefiting from the ESTA system, has had an adverse effect on the arrival in the country of Cubans residing abroad and visitors from the 42 countries that are benefitted from the program. It has also discouraged travel by US citizens to Cuba.

As a consequence of the US government's financial persecution, a growing number of foreign banks have refused to work with Cuba, which has led to a drastic reduction in commercial operations, with the consequent impact on the sale of tourist packages. Havanatur, a leader in the promotion and marketing of Cuban tourism products, has faced the closure of its accounts abroad, which has resulted in a loss of USD 2,180,900.

The slowness of the payment processes currently used by banks has caused serious harm. The inability to use the US dollar has led travel agencies to resort to highly risky and costly transfer methods, often involving more than three currency exchanges, which causes significant losses.

The obstacles imposed on commercial transactions with Cuba have led to a decline in potential investors in the tourism sector, thus affecting the development of the business lines of the extra-hotel services company Palmares S.A. and the four projects contained in the Foreign Investments Opportunity Portfolio. In the case of the Varadero Water Park project, around 30 companies have been invited to participate, but they have either declined or lost interest.

Added to this are the aggressive political and media campaigns to discredit the quality of tourism services and Cuba as a safe destination.

The biotechnology sector is also impacted by the blockade. The “Cuban Democracy Act” (Torricelli Act) explicitly prohibits the sale of inputs and raw materials for the biotechnology industry in Cuba. During this period, damages in this area amount to approximately **USD 129,270,055**, resulting from lost export revenues, losses due to geographical relocation of trade and monetary impacts.

The blockade caused difficulties in 14 operations of the Finlay Vaccine Institute (IFV), for reasons of reagents, raw materials and supplies. Most of these materials had to be purchased through third parties, which led to significant increases in prices per unit and freight costs.

Medsol Laboratories was unable to produce Omeprazole, Fluconazole and Oseltamivir capsules due to a breakdown in its German-made equipment, the Harro Höfliger capsule filler. Although the importation of spare parts and technical assistance was arranged through FARMACUBA, in December, 2024, the manufacturer decided to end negotiations with Cuba because of the blockade. This resulted in a loss of USD 1,020,272. 99 and reduced the availability of these medicines for the Cuban population.

The commercial transaction for the purchase of hemodialysis bags from the then KAM Bag in Box Latam Company in Argentina could not be carried out because, as a result of its merger with a US entity, it is not allowed to establish commercial relations with Cuban institutions.

The tightening of the blockade has maintained a high perception of risk among US companies for the negotiation and future marketing of the Cuban product Heberprot-P, the only one of its kind in the world for the treatment of diabetic foot ulcers, which reduces amputations due to this disease. If this product could be exported to the US, patients from that country would have access to this innovative treatment, and revenues from this source would have amounted to some USD 90,000,000 during the period covered by this report.

In the case of the **energy and mining sector**, damages during the period under review have been estimated at USD 496,075,620. The National Electric Union reports the largest amount of damages, which amount to USD 279,345,500.

The economic blockade has exacerbated financial constraints and access to credit to repair the country's thermo power plants; acquire the necessary technologies and fuel to ensure a stable power supply to the population and strategic sectors of the national economy and create new power generation capacities from renewable energy sources that allow for greater energy independence in the Island.

The blockade has affected imports for the Cuban oil industry. The average cost of a 20-foot container from China in 2024 was USD 5,980; from Europe USD 2,590 and from Canada USD 3,925. From Houston to Mariel, under normal conditions, the cost would not exceed the range from USD 800 to USD 1,000, depending on the time of year. Therefore, in 2024, Cuba would have saved USD 1,014,298 dollars by replacing freight costs if it had been able to access that product in the US.

The persecution of fuel transfer operations to Cuba, including shipping companies, insurers, reinsurers, banks, individual persons and

governments, has reduced the portfolio of foreign suppliers; and those that are still part of said portfolio have increased their prices considerably, based on the Country Risk.

As a result of that persecution, fuel imports are paid for through irrevocable and confirmed letters of credit (payable at sight) with a single bank, whose confirmation capacity is limited and often does not cover the value of the shipments to be imported during one month.

Obstacles to the importation of fuel, spare parts, and machinery, including suppliers' fears of US sanctions, have severely affected the prolonged instability of the National Power System (SEN) and the constant breakdowns in the thermal power generation mechanisms, which have limited the operation of distributed generation in the country.

Power generation absorbs most of the fuel imported to sustain the Cuban economy: more than half of all the fuel used by the country is allocated to power generation. The country needs to spend between USD 250,000,000 and USD 350,000,000 each year just to maintain power generation under normal operating conditions. The attack on the country's sources of hard currency has prevented it from having the financial resources necessary to keep the National Power System operational.

At the end of 2024, the lack of material resources and financing resulting from the impact of the blockade caused national crude oil production to decline by some 138,028 tons. In this complex situation, the country manages to produce approximately 40,000 barrels per day, which can only cover one-third of national consumption.

The total generation capacity of the Cuban Electric Union is 5,646 megawatts. However, only 2,122 megawatts, or 38 per cent, are available daily. Between 4,800,000 and 5,000,000 tons of fuel are required to meet the country's normal electricity demand, at a cost raging between USD 1,600,000,000 and USD 1,800,000,000 per year, depending on fuel price variability in the market. As a result of that, there have been continued power outages that affect the population and have a cross-cutting impact on all sectors of the economy.

Since January 10, 2024, the 'Ernesto Che Guevara' thermoelectric power plant has been unable to receive spare parts for its pumps after the Italian supplier C.R. Technology Systems was acquired by Trillium Flow Technologies, which manages purchases from the US. The lack of OFAC authorization for legal permits prevented the contract from being completed. This has led to limitations that have extended into the current period under review, causing limitations in generation units, increased

energy costs and blackouts that have affected the country's electricity service.

The power plants 'Ernesto Guevara de la Serna', 'Diez de Octubre' and 'Máximo Gómez' use VOITH electro-hydraulic actuators in their modernized turbines. Over time, this equipment wears out. Regular suppliers, such as Real Control and Energo-Control have reported that, due to the Helms-Burton Act, they cannot sell this equipment to Cuba. Consequently, Block number 2 of the 'Ernesto Guevara' thermoelectric power plant cannot currently be started up.

The company Taichi HD Cuba, which was asked to supply a new VCS-6000 AVR excitation system for the 'Carlos Manuel de Céspedes' thermoelectric power plant, responded that Mitsubishi Generator Corp is the appropriate company to handle this matter. However, it said it cannot submit a quote for the new system due to strict US government sanctions, and that this decision would not be changed.

During the period under review, the economic damages caused by the blockade to the **information and communications technology sector**, including telecommunications, have been estimated at **USD 78,064,500**. ETECSA continued to be the most affected company, recording losses amounting to USD 73,675,900, which accounts for 94.3 per cent of the total damages caused in the sector.

Financial difficulties resulting mainly from the impact of the blockade have affected ETECSA's infrastructure and service quality, with the company reporting losses of more than USD 500,000,000 annually over the past three years. The accumulation of debts and frauds promoted by illegal operators abroad meant that, of every 20 dollars in international recharge sales, 18 dollars were obtained by illegal operators and therefore were not deposited in ETECSA's accounts.

Continued harassment and pressures on entities with commercial relations with Cuba and others interested in negotiating with Cuban communications companies have had a negative impact on the possibility of having adequate infrastructure, greater access to the Internet and ICTs introduction to further develop the process of technological modernization in the country.

The main telecommunications technology suppliers (Ericsson, Alcatel, and Huawei) require an End User Declaration, which delays the process of contracting and delivering equipment and affects the sovereignty of third countries in their relations with Cuba in the field of communications and information technology.

The blockade makes it impossible to access high-performance brands and equipment distributed by leading US companies in the sector, such as Dell, Cisco, HP, Netgear, Grandstream-Networks, APC, among others. Restrictions on the supply of technologies and equipment produced under license or with US components have forced the country to resort to more distant markets, with the consequent increase in freight, repair and maintenance costs.

Cuba's continued presence in the list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism hinders the reception of private express parcels from the US. In the absence of a money order agreement between the US and Cuba, citizens of both countries continue to use riskier alternatives. The suspension of Western Union services due to punitive measures by the US government has exacerbated the situation. For this reason, more than USD 837,200,000 have failed to enter the country, with the foreseeable impact this would have on innumerable Cuban families.

Postal administrations of several countries from all continents, which previously used to pay Cuban banks directly, were unable to do so due to the financial blockade.

Payments for the broadcast of the 2024 Paris Olympic Games on Cuban television increased by USD 114,807.21, which exceeded the cost of the service, due to the ban on commercial transactions involving US companies or others associated companies that depend on US banks for their transactions. It was necessary to resort to intermediaries, with the consequent increase in costs.

Restrictions on the access to broadband Internet links remain in place, which affects the download speed of software, music, radio and television programs that are broadcast in real time, as well as access to sites offering updates to programs used by millions of users worldwide. The Adobe site continues to be blocked for Cuba, thus making it impossible to access help for certain programs that are only available online, such as the latest versions of the Audition CS6 multi-track editor. Other sites of interest, such as Source Forge, WeTransfer, DELL and INTEL have been placed under these restrictions.

These obstacles restrict the flow of information and widespread access to the Internet in Cuba; they make connectivity difficult and expensive and limit Cuban users' access to various virtual platforms.

Cuban representatives have faced numerous difficulties to participate in virtual meetings and events, since Cuba has restricted access to several

digital platforms, such as Zoom. In other cases, sites appear to be restricted to Cuban IP addresses in accordance with measures imposed by OFAC, which is discriminatory and illegal.

The global market for radio and television supplies is dominated by large international corporations such as Sony Group Corporation, Panasonic Corporation, and JVC Kenwood Holdings Inc., which distribute their products by specific geographic regions. For Cuba's Institute of Information and Social Communication (ICS), this means that it must purchase resources through authorized distributors for Latin America, many of which are located in Miami. Due to the blockade, Cuban requests are often ignored, thus forcing the country to resort to intermediaries in Europe, placing it at a significant disadvantage in terms of technological modernization.

During the period under review, it has been estimated that the damage caused by the blockade to the Cuban industry amounts to **USD 51,069,079.54**, which results from the loss of goods and services export incomes, the geographical relocation of trade, the exchange rate fluctuations, the impact of the technological blockade and the shortages of fuel. Below there is a description of some of the most significant impacts on this sector:

- The company ACINOX Comercial cannot purchase the raw materials, spare parts and metals necessary for metallurgical production in the US market; therefore, these products must be purchased in more distant markets.
- As a result of the implementation of the Torricelli Act, the shipping companies Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A., A.P. Møller-Mærsk, COSCO SHIPPING Lines Co, Evergreen Marine Corporation and Zim Integrated Shipping Service have stopped trading with Cuba. There are only three shipping companies that maintain commercial ties with the country.
- The telecommunications company COPEXTEL S.A. was only able to import from 57 suppliers out of a portfolio of 628, accounting for 9.08 per cent. Of those 57 suppliers, 91.2 per cent are intermediaries, while 8.8 per cent are manufacturers, which had an impact on the increased costs of the products and services purchased.
- The closure of banking operations between international and Cuban banks was confirmed, as in the case of the National Bank of Canada,

which rejected the letter of credit for operations with Cuba's Chemical Industry Business Group.

- Steel mills were expected to produce 87,015 tons of exportable steel this year, which would generate export revenues amounting to USD 894,780.42. However, this was not possible due to the energy shortages and fuel deficits caused by the impact of the blockade.
- There have been shortages in the supply of toothpaste, chlorine bleach and floor cloths, due to the shortage of raw materials in the industry and the instability in supplies.
- The store chain Caribe reported losses estimated at USD 50,180,000, a 319 per cent increase as compared to 2023. Furthermore, a large amount of equipment was written off in 2024 due to the lack of spare parts for repair.
- Purchases of refrigerated products such as chicken, turkey and beef, which are mainly produced in North America, must be made in other countries, which lead to increased freight costs, higher commodities costs, longer shipping times, and the need to store these products in warehouses to keep the necessary reserves and ensure restocking of commercial units.
- The Cuban entity Fincimex is prevented from operating the main remittance market to Cuba, since it has been included in the US State Department's list of restricted entities. Without the blockade, USD 900,000 would have been received as family aid for Cuban citizens in 2024.

The construction sector continues to face serious difficulties to access more efficient and lighter construction technologies consuming less basic materials and energy components. Between March, 2024 and February, 2025, losses in this sector were reported to be worth **USD 161,862,700**.

The housing construction program was one of the hardest-hit, with damages amounting to USD 34,324,900. Supply plans for this program were met by only 28 per cent.

The main damages resulted from difficulties in accessing essential goods and technologies for the materials manufacturing industry, including cement, aggregates, steel, paints, water tanks, lightweight roofing, blocks,

fiber-cement tiles, asphalt blankets and carpentry. Added to this are the termination of contracts with foreign suppliers and the difficulties in transportation due to fuel shortages.

The greatest damage caused by insufficient fuel supplies and the shortage of material resources were evidenced in construction projects at airports, the National Highway, the Central Highway, the northern cays, the Central Water Transfer Canal and the Eastern Water Transfer Canal.

The damage caused by the blockade to **the transport sector** - maritime, automotive, railway and air transportation- reached the figure of USD 353,034,200 between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

In recent years, there has been a progressive deterioration in the passengers' transportation capacity and infrastructure, given the low technical availability of vehicles, the impossibility of accessing spare parts, both due to lack of liquidity and the refusal of suppliers, as well as the measures adopted since 2019 by the US government to prevent fuel supplies. This has led to a lower service offer to the population.

For example, at least 1,200 operational vehicles are required to guarantee passengers' transportation in the capital. Currently, there are only 566, of which between 120 and 170 operate daily. A total of 48,000 tons of diesel is needed to meet transportation demands in Havana, which is not possible due to the shortage of financing and the increased cost of operations as a result of the siege imposed against Cuba.

Still in place are the restrictions imposed on international ship- owners, whose vessels are crewed by Cubans; and the obstacles to access US ports, by virtue of the Torricelli Act. When the corresponding authorities learn that any given vessel is crewed by Cuban staff, in addition to holding said vessel outside the port for several hours, they establish a guard on the ship, the cost of which is to be borne by the shipping company or ship-owner, at a rate of USD 1,500 per every day of stay in said port, and in addition to that our sailors are not allowed to go ashore.

In the case of air transportation, the US government continues to withhold licenses to lease aircraft, which means that the company Cubana de Aviación cannot bid for international flights. Nor can aircraft having more than 10 percent US-made components be purchased, which also affects domestic air transportation.

Interline agreements for cargo transportation remain canceled, thus preventing its commercialization with Cubana de Aviación airway bills and the increase in multi-destination sales in commercial alliances with

Avianca, DHL, Air France, LATAM, and Lot Polish. The cancellation of these agreements affects the service that could be offered to the exports and imports of business and non-state sectors, since they are forced to use alternative routes at higher costs.

Impacts on the emerging sectors of the Cuban economy

Until April, 2025, there were 11,233 private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) registered in Cuba. The blockade also affects the activity of these private entrepreneurs, business owners and Cuban cooperatives. In 2024, 608 MSMEs -6 per cent of the total- reported losses.

The US administration has repeatedly claimed that the blockade is only intended to punish the Cuban government and not the people or the private sector. The measures announced in May 2024, supposedly to benefit this sector in terms of access to digital and financial services, never materialized. The structural barriers of the blockade and its legal framework remain the main obstacle to any economic activity in Cuba.

US technology companies intended to unlock tools face the challenge of discriminating between state and private actors.

Cuba's inclusion in the list of alleged States sponsors of terrorism deters international transactions for fear of fines. Added to this is the rejection of foreign shipping companies and banks, which avoid doing business with Cuba due to secondary sanctions and regulatory volatility, which also harms the activity of the non-state sector.

Travel alerts and restrictions on the trips to Cuba have affected incomes from tourism and accommodation, a service provided by a majority segment of the Cuban private sector. The List of Prohibited Accommodations, Cuba's inclusion in the List of States Sponsors of Terrorism and the ban on individual people-to-people travel exchanges, among other measures already outlined, have affected this sector and significantly reduced bookings in private rental homes. The main restriction imposed on these actors is the lack of access to the US tourist market, which places them at a competitive disadvantage as compared to other destinations in the region.

Cuba has a capacity of more than 20,000 rooms in private rental homes. Between March, 2024 and February, 2025, of the 139,358 US citizens who visited the country, only 9.6 per cent stayed at these accommodations, which represented a sharp reduction of 82.2 per cent as compared to the previous period as a result of the policies implemented. If the current

restrictions and prohibitions did not exist and the flow of US visitors increased, the Cuban private sector could have earned additional incomes amounting to approximately USD 14,400,000.

In Old Havana, when cruise ship operations from the US began in 2016, private businesses catering to these tourists proliferated. New restaurants, Cuban handicrafts shops, kiosks selling Cuban literature and cars and taxis for hire, among other services, opened up. With the ban on cruise ships visits to Cuba, all these businesses were affected, and even many of them in several provinces of the country closed.

The impossibility to process non-immigrant visas in Havana has limited the ability of Cuban entrepreneurs to travel to the US, the closest natural market for acquiring the supplies necessary for their activity.

Coercive measures by the US government against financial institutions have led several payment and e-commerce platforms, such as PayPal, to refuse to provide services to these individuals simply because they are Cuban, regardless of the type of business they run. They are equally unable to access Visa or Mastercard cards to acquire supplies for their businesses, since these are banned for Cubans anywhere in the world.

Therefore, they do not have a secure online payment method, not even through a third country. Consequently, bank branches do not complete their transactions and many customers decide not to continue their relationships with private Cuban entities.

Limitations on the access to the US market make imports and exports more expensive and often difficult for these actors. The “Nuevo Golfito” Local Development project, based in the Alamar neighborhood of Havana, is a community resort designed for the enjoyment of local residents, particularly children, with a traditional mini golf course and other recreational options. Faced with power outages resulting from the limitations imposed by the blockade on the proper functioning of the National Power System, Roger Núñez Hernández, the founder and manager of “Nuevo Golfito,” is working to acquire solar panels that will allow his project to operate optimally. Núñez Hernández stated: *“We have tried to find options to import them from the US and other closer markets, but the blockade regulations limit our access. That is why we are exploring more distant markets, but the cost of freight makes this alternative too expensive.”*

Similarly, PDL Remolques-YGC-Cuba has faced obstacles in manufacturing its product: trailers for cars, motorcycles, and bicycles. Its founder, Yosvany García Cruz, explained that *“although our trailers are*

made from recycled materials and are very popular among users, there are certain parts and supplies that, if purchased in the US or other nearby markets, would facilitate and speed up the production and delivery process. Unfortunately, this option is not viable due to the obstacles imposed by the blockade."

The blockade is a violation of International Law. Extraterritorial implementation of the blockade

The blockade violates international law. It is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It constitutes a violation of the right to peace, development, self-determination and sovereignty of the Cuban people and State.

Given its essence and objectives, it is an act of unilateral aggression and a permanent threat to the stability of the country. It violates the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, sovereign equality, the promotion of friendly relations among countries and freedom of trade.

The blockade not only damages economic, commercial, and financial ties between Cuba and the US. It aims to, and succeeds in, damaging Cuba's economic and commercial relations with any country in the world, with disregard for its sovereign prerogatives and the rights of its citizens. It is a malicious purpose that takes legal form in the Helms-Burton Act.

In its attempt to prevent foreign investment in the country, persecute Cuban transactions and restrict the normal development of all Cuba's operations abroad, the US government resorts to a variety of instruments and forms of pressure through its regulatory agencies.

The blockade qualifies as an act of genocide and a flagrant, massive and systematic violation of the human rights of the entire Cuban people. It is a cruel policy of punishment, as this report attests through factual information and data that reinforce the denunciation of this grave injustice.

In addition to the examples already presented, Annex 4 lists four additional cases of extraterritorial implementation of the blockade between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

Universal rejection of the blockade

The international movement calling for an end to the blockade has been highly active. More than 2,000 public events, interventions and documents adopted at international events condemned the blockade, its unjust nature and its devastating impact on the Cuban people. More than 1,703

statements have been made by 57 governments and 107 political parties against the arbitrary inclusion of the country in the unilateral list of alleged State sponsors of terrorism. Six hundred individual parliamentarians as well the parliaments of Russia, Syria, Namibia, Burundi, and Jamaica signed the Progressive International Initiative. There have also been 473 statements from solidarity movements, associations or groups; 28 statements from international organizations, including those mentioned above; 254 media reports and 87 interventions by other personalities.

Likewise, members of the US society have increasingly called for an end to the blockade and the arbitrary designation of Cuba as a State that allegedly sponsors terrorism. Federal and state congressmen, academics, economists, politicians, religious leaders, scientists, young people and the solidarity movement undertook several initiatives to pressure the White House.

Noteworthy are the statements against the blockade made by numerous governments and personalities, UN experts, solidarity movements and associations of Cubans living abroad, parliaments, and heads of State and Government.

Condemnations of the blockade and its extraterritorial nature were included in the final documents of the Nineteenth NAM Summit, the Third South Summit, the resolution against the blockade adopted at the Thirty Eighth African Union Summit, the Eighth CELAC Summit, the Twenty Third ALBA-TCP Summit, the statement of the G77-NAM Joint Coordinating Committee, the Forty Seventh Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, the Forty Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the G77 and China, among other relevant fora.

It should be pointed out that in July 2024, several special procedures mandate holders of the UN Human Rights Council⁴ called for the US government to lift the blockade and remove Cuba from the list of alleged States sponsors of terrorism and *"... to fully comply with all its international human rights obligations, including extraterritorially, and take swift action to end such measures,"* stating that Cuba's re-designation as a State sponsor of terrorism has imposed a series of additional economic and financial restrictions with aggravated adverse effects on the country's ability to meet the needs of its population at a critical time when Cuba faces serious economic challenges.

⁴ Alena Douhan, Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures; Cecilia M. Bailliet, United Nations independent expert on human rights and international solidarity; Georgios Katrougalos, UN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order.

On February 7, 2025, four of these human rights experts⁵ called for the US government to end the blockade against Cuba and rejected the new inclusion of the Island in the list of States sponsors of terrorism by the Donald Trump administration. They recalled that they had already sent previous communications on the subject to the US government, without receiving a response. They denounced that this decision has serious consequences for the human rights of the Cuban people; negatively affects the country's commercial and financial relations and hinders national efforts to address the cumulative effects of the blockade, the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disasters. They described the measure as an act of unilateral coercion incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and International Law, which violated the UN resolutions declaring the use of unilateral coercive measures as illegal and called for an end to the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba⁶

On October 18, 2024, Cuba submitted its Ninth Periodic Report to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Committee recognized the negative impact of the economic, commercial, and financial blockade on the enjoyment of human rights by women and girls in Cuba, as well as the damage caused by Cuba's unjust inclusion in the list of States that allegedly sponsor terrorism.

Annex 5 lists actions taken during the period under review, within the US society and at the international level, to reject the blockade.

Conclusions

The economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the US government against Cuba constitutes a unilateral, coercive and extraterritorial policy that violates international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It undermines the Cuban people's right to peace, development and self-determination. It is a massive, flagrant, and systematic violation of their human rights. It undermines the Cuban economy and directly affects the well-being of the population. It makes no distinction between social sectors or economic actors. It restricts the constitutional rights of US citizens and violates the sovereignty of third countries by imposing extraterritorial sanctions.

⁵ Alena Douhan, Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures; Attiya Waris, UN independent expert on foreign debt; Georgios Katrougalos, UN independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order; Reem Alsalem, UN special rapporteur on violence against women and girls.

⁶ See <https://www.ohchr.org/es/press-releases/2025/02/united-states-experts-dismayed-decision-reinstate-cuba-state-sponsor>

It is unacceptable, illegitimate, and immoral for any people to be submitted to a coercive and harmful policy that causes economic damages that exceeds **USD 170,677,200,000** at current prices, and **USD 2,103,897,000,000** taking into account the value of the dollar against the price of gold. Between March, 2024 and February, 2025 alone, the damages caused by the blockade to Cuba were estimated at **USD 7,556,100,000**.

The figures and examples presented here will never fully reflect the harmful impact that the blockade has had on the Cuban people. However, the US government remains steadfast in its application of this cruel and illegal policy. After more than 60 years, the main goal pursued by the blockade has not changed: to deteriorate the standard of living of the population, provoke dissatisfaction, despair and irritation as a means to bring about a change in the constitutional order that the Cuban people have freely chosen.

The US administration persists in ignoring the almost unanimous call of the international community for an end to this illegal and inhumane policy against Cuba, expressed in 32 resolutions of the UN General Assembly.

The call for the unconditional lifting of the US blockade is almost universal, and its cause is a just cause. Voices are multiplying alongside the Cuban people calling for the immediate lifting of the blockade, the cessation of the persecution of Cuba's international economic and financial relations, the elimination of funds allocated to subvert its internal order and carry out disinformation operations as well as Cuba's removal from the unilateral list of State sponsors of terrorism.

Despite all of the above, Cuba remains committed to establishing a civilized and respectful relationship with the US government through dialogue and cooperation with all the sectors of the US society that are interested in improving bilateral relations.

As Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez stated at the closing ceremony of the Fourth Ordinary Session of the National Assembly of People's Power in December 2024: *"Yes, the blockade exists. Yes, it has been tightened. Yes, we are faced with an economic war. Yes, they despise us. Yes, they grossly, obscenely are intoxicating us, filled with hatred, on the social media. But we also have -and this is what matters the most-, a heroic and dignified people. And we shall always overcome, as long as that heroism that runs in the genes of all Cubans, continues to*

grow bigger and reveals itself before all adversaries with the essential and sacred component of unity around one single goal: to preserve independence, sovereignty, and social justice."

Annex 1: US blockade laws and regulations.

- Trading with the Enemy Act (1917): Section 5(b) delegated to the head of the executive branch the power to apply coercive measures in times of war or at any other period of national emergency and prohibited trade with the enemy or allies of the enemy during armed conflicts.
- Foreign Assistance Act (1961): Authorized the President to establish and maintain a total “embargo” on trade with Cuba and prohibited the granting of any aid to the Cuban government.
- Presidential Proclamation 3447 (by President Kennedy, February 3, 1962): Decreed a total “embargo” on trade between the US and Cuba.
- Treasury Department Regulations for the Control of Cuban Assets (1963): Stipulates the freezing of all Cuban assets in the US; the prohibition of all financial and commercial transactions, unless approved by a license; the prohibition of Cuban exports to the US; the prohibition of any natural or legal person from the US or third countries from conducting transactions in US dollars with Cuba; among other provisions.
- Export Administration Act (1979): Section 2401 (b) (1) “National Security Control,” “Policy toward Certain States,” establishes the Trade Control List, in which the President maintains a number of countries that may be subject to special export controls for national security considerations. Cuba is included in that list.
- Export Administration Regulations (1979): Establishes a denial policy for exports and re-exports to Cuba.
- Cuban Democracy Act or Torricelli Act (1992): Prohibits subsidiaries of US companies in third countries from trading goods with Cuba or Cuban nationals. It prohibits third-country ships that call at Cuban ports from entering US territory within 180 days, except those licensed by the Treasury.
- Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act or Helms-Burton Act (1996): Codified the provisions of the blockade, expanding its

extraterritorial scope by imposing sanctions on executives of foreign companies that conduct transactions with US properties nationalized in Cuba and threatening lawsuits in US courts. It limited the president's prerogatives to lift the blockade policy as a whole.

- Section 211 of the Supplemental and Emergency Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999: It prohibits US courts from recognizing the rights of Cuban companies to trademarks associated with nationalized property.
- Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (2000): It authorized the export of agricultural products to Cuba, conditional on cash payment in advance and without US financing. It prohibited U.S. citizens from traveling to Cuba for tourism purposes, defining “tourism activity” as any activity related to travel to, from, or within Cuba that was not expressly authorized under section 515.560 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In other words, it limited travel only to the 12 categories that were authorized at the time when this legislation was enacted.

Annex 2: Blockade measures adopted by the US government between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

On **March 15, 2024**, OFAC imposed a penalty of 3 740 442.00 dollars on the banking company EFG International AG for violating the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and other sanctions programs.

On March 23, **2024**, President Biden signed the Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2024, which allocated 25 million dollars for illegal radio and television broadcasts to Cuba and the same amount for programs supposedly supporting democracy. It was clarified that these funds could not be used for the promotion of business, economic reforms, entrepreneurship or any other activity in Cuba not authorized under the Helms-Burton and Torricelli laws.

On **September 9, 2024**, OFAC issued a final rule (CFR Part 501) extending from five to ten years the period during which persons subject to US jurisdiction, who provide authorized services to Cuba, are required to maintain records in relation to such services.

On **September 13, 2024**, President Biden extended the restrictions of the blockade against Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act for one year.

On **September 27, 2024**, President Biden issued a presidential determination to the Secretary of State for submission to Congress, instructing the U.S. executive director of each multilateral development bank and the International Monetary Fund to make every effort to deny any loan or other use of the respective institution's funds for Cuba.

On **December 2, 2024**, the US president signed the bipartisan, bicameral bill “No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023,” codifying it into law, which added up to the blockade measures.

On **December 13, 2024**, OFAC announced a settlement in the amount of 257 thousand 690 dollars reached with the global transportation and logistics company C.H. Robinson International Inc. The measure was due to violations of coercive programs against Iran and Cuba for transporting products to these nations on multiple occasions.

On **January 20, 2025**, President Trump, on his first day in office, signed the Executive Order “Initial Rescissions of Executive Orders and Actions Detrimental to the United States,” which repealed a significant portion of the measures toward Cuba taken by Biden on January 14 and ordered the re-creation of the list of restricted entities.

On **January 31, 2025**, the State Department announced the revocation of the suspension of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

On **February 5, 2025**, the State Department published an update to the Restricted Entities List for Cuba, with the addition of Orbit.SA, a Cuban company dedicated to processing remittances.

On **February 21, 2025**, the White House published the memorandum “America First, Investment Policy” to facilitate investments from allied countries and restrict the investment capabilities of China and countries considered “foreign adversaries.” Cuba is considered an adversary, and access to US technology, especially in artificial intelligence, is limited.

On **February 25, 2025**, the Secretary of State announced the expansion of the visa restriction policy for individuals who “exploit Cuban labor.” The measure seeks to intensify financial persecution of Cuba by targeting the country's incomes from medical cooperation programs and promoting the severance of relations with other countries by applying visa sanctions to current or former Cuban government officials and other individuals,

including foreign government officials and their family members, involved in what it considers a “Cuban labor export program,” particularly Cuba's medical missions abroad.

In **March 2025**, the US government announced the termination of the humanitarian parole program for Cubans, Haitians, Venezuelans and Nicaraguans and the implementation of CBP One.

On **March 19, 2025**, the US government included Cuba in the list of countries that do not maintain “effective anti-terrorism measures” in their ports. The measure authorizes the US Coast Guard to impose entry requirements on vessels coming from Cuban territory.

On **June 30, 2025**, the US government reissued Presidential Memorandum No. 5, ratifying the policy of maximum economic pressure as a criminal and illegal instrument to achieve hegemonic objectives and regime change in Cuba. The new document joins the list of coercive measures against Cuba that existed previously and provides a platform for refining the mechanisms of economic and political coercion against the country and against third countries with ties to Cuba.

Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the implementation of the blockade against Cuba.

- Remove Cuba from the State Department's list of State sponsors of terrorism.
- Reverse the policy of financial persecution against Cuba, including the one related to fuel supplies to the country.
- Suspend the possibility of filing lawsuits in US courts against US and third-country companies under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.
- Modify the permissible limit of 10 per cent of US components in goods that Cuba can import from any country in the world.
- Request that the State and Treasury Departments remove Cuban entities from other unilateral lists, such as the List of Restricted Cuban Entities, the List of Prohibited Accommodations and the List of Specially Designated Nationals.

- Instruct US representatives in international financial institutions not to block loans or other financial facilities to Cuba.
- Enable Cuban entities to open correspondent accounts in US banks.
- Authorize exports to Cuba of US products for key sectors of the economy, such as mining, tourism and biotechnology.
- Authorize the importation by the US of any merchandise manufactured or derived from products grown, produced or manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar, tobacco, rum or others).
- Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnology products.
- Relax the policy to grant licenses to US companies to invest in Cuba.
- Authorize US citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.
- Authorize broader forms of cooperation for the development, marketing and supply of Cuban-made medicines and biomedical products, for example, through direct investments by US companies and joint ventures.
- Authorize sales of the raw materials that Cuba needs to produce medicines for the Cuban population and other developing countries.
- Authorize US subsidiaries to do business with Cuba that is not related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the Torricelli Act).

Annex 4: Some examples of the extraterritorial implementation of the blockade against Cuba between March, 2024 and February, 2025.

In **March, 2024**, OFAC denied Cuba the possibility of opening a bank account in Japan for the purpose of participating in EXPO Osaka 2025. This increased the costs for Cuba and made it difficult for the country to attend this international event.

On **March 15, 2024**, the Treasury Department's OFAC imposed a penalty of 3 740 442.00 dollars on the Swiss-based banking company EFG International AG for violating the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and other sanctions programs.

On **April 15, 2024**, the YPF company in Argentina officially announced that it could no longer supply fuel to Cubana de Aviación, since its commercial relationship could pose a risk and exposure under US regulations.

In **early June, 2024**, the Courtyard hotel, belonging to the Marriot hotel network, refused a request from the Cuban embassy in Trinidad and Tobago to book an accommodation for the Cuban delegation attending the Small Island States Conference in Antigua and Barbuda, citing the restrictions of the blockade.

On **June 12, 2024**, the bank Société Générale in Senegal issued a letter announcing the closure of the account belonging to the Cuban Embassy in Senegal. This was in response to the implementation of the blockade and the impact of Cuba's designation as a State sponsor of terrorism.

Since August, 2024, the company Presencia Latinoamericana S.A., specialized in the promotion and marketing of Cuban cultural products and services in Mexico, has been affected by its inclusion on the US State Department's list of restricted entities. An example of this was the fact that BBVA bank canceled that company's accounts, claiming that transactions towards Cuba were prohibited under the provisions of the blockade.

On **September 30, 2024**, a high official from Honduras was denied renewal of her ESTA visa with her Spanish passport because she had traveled to Cuba.

On **October 3, 2024**, the Cuban embassy in Dominica reported that the National Bank of Dominica was unable to make a donation to Cuba because the intermediary bank was the Bank of America, which does not authorize such transactions.

On **November 29, 2024**, the Mexican bank INBURSA announced the cancellation of the Cuban account belonging to Taíno Tours, for this was “in the interest of the institution.” In practice, this was the results of the pressures from the United States as part of the blockade against Cuba.

On **December 13, 2024**, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury Department announced a 257 690 dollars settlement with the company C.H. Robinson International Inc. (CHR) to resolve its potential civil liability for 82 apparent violations committed by five of its subsidiaries outside the United States, which provided freight brokerage or transportation services for shipments in an apparent violation of OFAC sanctions against Cuba and Iran.

In **January, 2025**, the Belgian bank KBC refused to issue a credit card to the staff of the Cuban Embassy in Belgium, claiming compliance with the national legislation and the bank's internal policies on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, which showed its alignment with the US government's extraterritorial blockade policy against Cuba. Thus, that banking institution limited the financial operations it had maintained with the embassy since 1991.

In **April, 2025**, it became known that the owners of the aircraft of a Serbian airline would not authorize their planes to fly to Cuba due to the extraterritorial effect of the US blockade against Cuba, thus limiting the flow of travelers, particularly tourists, from Serbia to Cuba.

In **June, 2025**, the web platform Stripe notified the coordinators of the Solidarity with Cuba Campaign “From Australia to Cuba with Love” that their account on the platform was being closed because Cuba was a “risk jurisdiction.” Through this site, the Campaign raised funds for donations to Cuban hospitals and various projects in the country.

Annex 5: Actions denouncing the blockade against Cuba between March, 2024 and May, 2025

Denunciations of the blockade within the United States:

On **April 2, 2024**, political, religious, and civil rights leaders in Maryland sent a letter to Ben Cardin, then a federal senator and chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, calling for the lifting of the blockade against Cuba. The coalition of more than a hundred groups and

individuals claimed that the US government's sanctions are the main cause of the terrible humanitarian and economic conditions on the Island.

On **April 29, 2024**, the renowned economist, professor of Columbia University and political analyst Jeffrey Sachs called for the lifting of the blockade and an end to the US government's hostile policy toward Cuba at the conclusion of his speech at the Progressive International event on the New International Economic Order, held in Havana.

In **early May, 2025**, the Seventeenth May Day Brigade, which visited Cuba to celebrate the International Workers' Day, expressed its support to the lifting the economic blockade and the end of the US government's hostile policy.

On **May 6, 2024**, the Alliance for Commitment and Respect for Cuba (ACERE), based in Washington, D.C., coordinated the sending of a letter to President Joseph Biden, demanding the fulfillment of his 2020 campaign promises with regard to the policy toward Cuba, the end of the blockade and the removal of Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism. Signatories included Cuban Americans; former federal, state, and local officials; academics; business owners, executives and investors; lawyers; doctors; scientists; educators; artists, musicians and filmmakers, among others.

On **May 21, 2024**, at a congressional hearing, Representative Jim McGovern asked the Biden administration to remove Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, recognizing its impact on the suffering of the Cuban people and the increase in migration flows.

On **June 5, 2024**, Congresswomen Pramila Jayapal (Washington), Ilhan Omar (Minnesota) and Nydia Velázquez (New York) asked Biden, in a public statement, to remove Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

On **June 6, 2024**, the Communist Party of the United States approved, as part of its Thirty Second Convention, a resolution in favor of removing Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and the lifting the blockade.

On **June 17, 2024**, the 'Cuba Sí' Coalition of New York and New Jersey issued a statement calling for the Biden administration to remove Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and end the blockade.

On **June 18, 2024**, the president of the Executive Committee of the South Pacific Inland Boatmen's Union of California, part of the Marine Division of the International Longshoremen's and Warehouse Union (ILWU), included in the final document of its Thirty Ninth International Convention the resolution "Send pacemakers to Cuba and end the blockade." It called for Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

On **July 5, 2024**, the International Committee of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) reported that a total of 760 letters had been sent via the 'Activa Network' platform to US senators in favor of removing Cuba from the list of State sponsors of terrorism.

On **July 25, 2024**, the Latin America Working Group, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Alliance for Commitment and Respect for Cuba (ACERE), and the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) drafted a letter addressed to president Biden calling for Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

On **July 27, 2024**, Max Lesnik, director of Radio Miami Today; and Carlos Lazo, coordinator of the movement 'Puentes de Amor' called for an end to the blockade and Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism as part of a demonstration at Miami Airport.

On **July 31, 2024**, 46 Democratic members of Congress sent a letter to Biden in support of the peace process in Colombia, in which they demanded Cuba's removal from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

On **August 12, 2024**, 40 legal organizations and 200 lawyers sent a letter to Biden in favor of ending the US economic sanctions against other countries. The letter specifically mentioned the need to lift the blockade against Cuba.

On **November 19, 2024**, 18 members of Congress, led by Democrats Barbara Lee and James McGovern, sent a letter to President Biden explaining the need to ease coercive measures against Cuba; remove the country from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism; offer technical assistance and emergency humanitarian aid and facilitate means for the modernization and repair of Cuba's energy infrastructure.

On **December 17, 2024**, Senators Peter Welch, Jeffrey A. Merkley, Bernard Sanders, Ron Wyden, and Chris Van Hollen sent a letter to then-President Biden, urging him to remove Cuba from the List of State

Sponsors of Terrorism; restore US citizens' right to freely travel to Cuba and end the Trump-era "Cuba prohibition lists."

On **December 17, 2024**, former Havana Chief of Mission Vicki Huddleston and former Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes sent a letter to Biden urging the outgoing administration to remove Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism; increase humanitarian aid to the country and streamline regulations for Cuban citizens to access the US financial system.

On **January 25, 2025**, Senator Peter Welch rejected Cuba's new designation on the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

At the international level, the following actions stand out:

On **June 15, 2024**, the Declaration of the NAM-G77 Joint Coordination Committee, calling for the removal of Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and an end to the blockade was adopted

On **June 19, 2024**, a special communiqué was issued by the Group of Friends in Defense of the UN Charter in New York, condemning the blockade and demanding Cuba's removal from the List of States that Allegedly sponsor of terrorism.

On **June 27, 2024**, at the Fifty Sixth Session of the Human Rights Council, a declaration was presented by 123 countries demanding the removal of Cuba from the unilateral List of States that Allegedly Sponsor Terrorism.

On **July 30, 2024**, the Forty Seventh CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in Grenada approved a Declaration condemning the blockade against Cuba and its inclusion in the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

On **September 27, 2024**, the Declaration adopted at the Forty Eighth G77 and China Ministerial Meeting held in New York, not only called for an end to the blockade against Cuba, but also, for the first time, condemned Cuba's inclusion in the arbitrary List of States that allegedly Sponsor Terrorism.

From September 24 to 30 of 2024, during the General Debate of the Seventy Ninth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the heads of delegations from 46 countries included in their speeches a condemnation of the blockade against Cuba. In 23 of these references,

Cuba's inclusion in the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism was also denounced.

On **October 30, 2024**, UNGA approved, by 187 votes in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention, the resolution on the *“Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.”* Fifty-four speakers spoke in favor of lifting the blockade and 43 of them against the inclusion of Cuba in the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Nine consultation groups and regional organizations joined both denunciations, namely: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Group of 77 and China, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the African Group, and the European Union.

On **December 14, 2024**, the Declaration of the Twenty Fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government of ALBA-TCP was adopted, which, in addition to condemning the blockade, denounced the inclusion of Cuba in the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

On **February 15, 2025**, at the Thirty Eighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the resolution on the lifting of the blockade imposed on Cuba by the US government was approved for the sixteenth consecutive time. The text also calls for the removal of Cuba from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

In **March, 2025**, the countries that are members of the Group of Friends in Defense of the United Nations Charter issued a strong statement at the UN Human Rights Council condemning the new inclusion of Cuba in the US government unilateral list of countries allegedly sponsoring terrorism.